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Testamentary Freedom – Myth or Reality? 
Juliet Brook1 
Testamentary freedom has been cited as an integral part of the law of England and Wales; the Law 
Commission has described the idea of forced heirship as ‘alien to our legal tradition’.2  Yet despite the 
only statutory limitation to testamentary freedom being the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975, there are other subtler statutory influences on our testamentary dispositions, 
such as the provisions of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984.   
The first part of this paper will be historical in nature, briefly considering the context in which 
testamentary freedom was first granted and the restrictions that were placed on that freedom during 
the 20th Century.  Against this background the inheritance tax principles will then be set, so that a 
greater understanding can be gained as to why particular dispositions receive more favourable tax 
treatment.  Finally the changes to inheritance tax that came into effect in April 2017 will be examined, 
with consideration of the effects of those amendments on testamentary dispositions. 
Historical developments 
During the mediaeval period no testamentary dispositions of freehold land were permitted3 and 
instead the law of primogeniture developed so that generally there was only a single heir to land, at a 
time when it was important both that military rights of tenure were held by one person and when 
manorial lords were loath to see land sub-divided against their will.4  Whilst this was only a custom, 
and therefore could be subject to local variations, it should be noted that this was not merely the 
default provision to take effect in the absence of an election to the contrary (in the way that intestacy 
provisions are now) but was the law itself. 
The only freedom of testation that existed was limited to dispositive rights over chattels.   If a man 
were to die leaving a wife and child, his chattels were divided according to the “tripartite rule” which 
required one third to go to the spouse and one third to the children.  If a man were to die leaving 
either spouse or children then they would receive half.  Lifetime advances were to be brought into 
                                                          
1 Principal Lecturer, University of Portsmouth.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the SLS 
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2 Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Comm No. 331, 2011) para 1.21  
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account, but apart from that in each case it was only the final portion (half or third as appropriate) 
that could be freely distributed, and even then this was usually given to the Church.5   
This system was in force until the late 17th Century in Yorkshire6 but seems to have ceased elsewhere 
in England much earlier.  Adherence did vary around the country7 and the origin of the rule appears 
to be no more than custom and practice,8 but the proving of wills was operated by the ecclesiastical 
courts and within these courts the prevalence of local customs was far greater.  It should be noted 
that the echoing of this division in the medieval laws of intestacy9 suggests that it was an accepted 
division of personal property.  It is clear that for much of the middle ages it was only in the absence of 
spouse and issue that one’s chattels could be freely distributed on death.   
The process by which the law arrived at a state of testamentary freedom has therefore been a gradual 
one, with full testamentary freedom only coming in 1891 with the passing of the Mortmain and 
Charitable Uses Act.10  Notwithstanding this, the law of succession to land remained with its own 
peculiar quirks until 1926, for example the fact that express words were necessary to disinherit the 
heir at law,11 and the common law rules of descent also continued to govern the disposal of real 
property in intestacy situations until the same date.12  Therefore although the principle of 
testamentary freedom is often quoted as being a fundamental part of the law of succession in England 
and Wales, it has evolved slowly over time, as people gained greater control over both real and 
personal property.  
Family Provision Legislation 
Once this background is understood, the introduction of legislation to enable close family members 
to claim from an estate in 193913 does not seem to be as ground breaking as it may have felt at the 
time.  The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 was the culmination of a decade of parliamentary 
consideration of the extent to which a limitation should be placed upon testamentary freedom,14 with 
the focus throughout being on the conflict between the need for the testator to leave his family with 
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9 (n3) 360.  See also Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (OUP 2005) 479 for an 
analysis of the intestacy laws from 1670 onwards 
10 Roger Kerridge, The Law of Succession (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 
11 Halsbury’s Laws (2016) Vol 102, para 257 
12 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (OUP 2005) 479 
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sufficient property for their maintenance, whilst maintaining individual liberty and keeping the courts 
out of private family matters.15   
A report by a Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons16 juxtaposed the 
idea of complete testamentary freedom against the obligation to provide for one’s family, supported 
by the historic tripartite principle.17  From the modern perspective it comes as little surprise that the 
proposed compromise was to provide sufficient funds for subsistence, as opposed to creating a right 
for a fixed share of the property.  Within the evidence presented, however, was the idea that any 
statute might itself operate in a preventative way, to ensure that testators would not disinherit their 
family and would comply with public expectations of familial duty,18 thus recognising that legislation 
could have both an implicit and an explicit restriction on testamentary freedom. 
The provisions of the 1938 Act are worthy of consideration because they focus on the very limited 
family members that would have benefited under the tri-partite distribution, namely spouse and 
issue.  As first enacted any issue could only claim in so far as they were still dependant, i.e. minor sons 
or unmarried daughters.  Its successor, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 
1975, has expanded the categories of claimants to include: 
 A former spouse who has not re-married19 
 Any child of the deceased, regardless of age20 
 A person treated as a child of the family through marriage21 
 Any person maintained by the deceased immediately before their death22  
 Cohabitees of two years’ standing.23 
These incremental additions to the categories of claimants over the decades have been in response 
to changing family structures, the most recent being the amendment of s 1(1)(d) by the Inheritance 
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16 Report by the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on the Wills and 
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20 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1)(c) 
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and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 to include those treated as a child of the family even in the absence of 
marriage or civil partnership between the adults in loco parentis.  
However despite many more people being brought into the scope of the legislation as potential 
claimants the discretionary nature of the act by no means guarantees an award; the questions are 
whether the deceased’s will or intestacy makes ‘reasonable financial provision’24 for a claimant and, 
if not, what would amount to reasonable financial provision and the answers will always depend on 
the ‘obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards [them]’.25  Thus those towards 
whom the deceased had financial obligations have strong claims, whilst those whose claim is based 
on no more than a moral obligation have been less likely to be successful.26   
The on-going debate about the ability of a testator to exclude an adult child, and the extent to which 
they should be obliged to provide for them, was illustrated very clearly in the lengthy Ilott v Mitson27 
litigation.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case re-emphasised how the family provision 
legislation has always trodden a fine line between testamentary freedom and familial obligations; Lady 
Hale’s judgement commenced with Michael Albrey’s comment on the 1938 legislation: 
The protection of the rights of the family as an essential unit in society is a primary concern of 
most systems of law. Complete freedom of testation, as enjoyed under English law for a brief 
period of 47 years, is therefore by the standards of contemporary jurisprudence an anomaly.28 
Yet Lady Hale cited various quantitative and qualitative studies that examined how people felt the 
estate of a deceased should be distributed and contrasted the obligations that we owe to our spouses 
against those that we owe to independent adult children, using these to explain why the legislation 
did not give either children or spouses a right to a fixed share, but the more limited discretionary 
right.29  Therefore whilst the widening of the categories of potential claimants demonstrates the 
broader perspective from which the obligations of maintenance are now viewed, the judgement in 
Ilott v Mitson re-affirmed the core principle of testamentary freedom.   
Against this background the next (and most substantial) part of this paper will examine the means by 
which successive governments have used the taxation system to influence our testamentary 
                                                          
24 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1) 
25 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 3(1)(d) 
26 Re Jennings (deceased) [1994] Ch 286, CA 
27 Ilott v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ 346, Ilott v Mitson [2015] EWCA (Civ) 797 and Ilott v Mitson [2017] UKSC 17 
28 Ilott v Mitson [2017] UKSC 17 [50] 
29 ibid, [51-57] 
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dispositions, and consider the extent to which the taxation laws persuade testators to act in particular 
ways. 
The Inheritance Tax Act 1984 – Legacies to Spouses and Civil Partners 
The evolution of estate duties over the centuries is complex, so this paper will only consider the 
inheritance tax (IHT) principles set out within the Inheritance Tax Act 1984.  The payment of ‘death 
duties’ have long been a cause for complaint among the middle classes, as the tax rate of 40% on 
assets in excess of the nil rate band seems high in an era when the top rate of income tax is only 45% 
(and for much of recent history has been at only 40%).  IHT is a growing source of revenue for the 
Government.  In 2015-16 IHT receipts totalled £4.7bn and are expected to hit £5bn in 2017/18.30  
Whilst the percentage of estates that are required to pay IHT is still small it is rising, not least because 
the nil rate band (NRB) has been capped at £325,000 since April 2009.  This leads those who have 
sufficient assets to be liable to the tax to consider means of tax avoidance during their lifetime, and 
judicious means of lifetime dispositions and the correct type of investments31 can significantly reduce 
the taxation bill. 
Some statutory tax avoidance provisions would seem to be designed to encourage a particular type of 
behaviour.  For example the Finance Act 2012 introduced a lower rate of IHT tax of 36% for those who 
left a portion of their estate to charity.32 The aim of this was presumably to encourage testators to 
leave charitable legacies at a time when public finances were under particular pressure and the 
government wanted to reduce public spending on charities. 
In the context of family dispositions, gifts to spouses (and, more recently, civil partners) have long 
been tax exempt.  However the rapid rise in house prices during the 1990s increased the number of 
estates liable to IHT and this led to a growing realisation that what seemed to be a perk of marriage 
actually resulted in two individuals only benefiting from a single nil rate band.  There was therefore a 
contradiction within the taxation system.  On the one hand the testator was encouraged to leave 
everything to his / her spouse because this would mean there was no IHT payable.  It would also ensure 
that the survivor would be able to retain all of the family assets, in particular the family home.  On the 
other hand the beneficiaries of the survivor would pay for this privilege in the future, as only a single 
nil rate band was available to reduce the IHT liability.   
                                                          
30 http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/forecasts-in-depth/tax-by-tax-spend-by-spend/inheritance-tax/ 
31 For example Business Property Relief, Inheritance Tax Act 1984 s 104 
32 Finance Act 2012, Schedule 33.  The proportion to be left to charities is 10%, but the exact calculations are 
complex because it is calculated by reference to individual components of the estate. 
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The concerns about this led to increased use of Nil Rate Band Discretionary Trusts (NRBDT).  The idea 
behind these was simple; the first to die would leave a portion of their estate (up to, but not exceeding, 
the NRB limit) to chargeable beneficiaries such as children.  The surviving spouse could be one of the 
potential beneficiaries but crucially the property did not belong to them and so would not form part 
of their taxable estate on their eventual death.   
Whilst the NRBDT was borne out of a desire to prevent the “doubling up” of estates, the effect was to 
encourage those whose estates would be liable to IHT to make a will leaving a significant portion away 
from their spouse.  Although this was done for tax-saving reasons, it also had a side effect of promoting 
the children’s claim and protecting it in the event of the survivor re-marrying.   The tax advice given 
to married couples therefore directly impacted the type of will they made; many such couples left will 
trusts they would not otherwise have considered creating in order to reduce their IHT liability. 
The taxation benefits of the NRBDT were removed in 2007 with the announcement in the Autumn 
Statement that the NRB was to be transferable between spouses.33 The administrative costs of 
creating and running a NRBDT would now make them both unnecessary and unattractive, so instead 
of being used as a tax saving tool they became a device purely by which property could be directed 
towards a group of people (children, grandchildren etc.) in order to protect their inheritance in the 
event of re-marriage of the widowed spouse.  They remain popular for this reason, especially where 
there are children from more than one relationship and the testator wishes to ensure that a 
proportion of their estate will pass to their own children.   
Although the 2007 alteration was heralded as being a reaction to the fact that many people leave their 
estate to their spouse or civil partner and was therefore making the taxation system ‘fairer’34 the 
secondary effect was to re-state the principle that one should leave everything to the spouse / civil 
partner, implying that the spouse / civil partner is the most deserving of the shared wealth that you 
have generated together.  It is interesting to note that this echoes the discussions of the Law 
Commission in 1971 when they reviewed the family provision legislation, namely that children have 
less part to play in building up the family assets than spouses35 and therefore the testator has a greater 
discretion as to whether to leave property to their children. 
                                                          
33 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, 5.76.  This provision is now set out in the 
Inheritance Act 1984 s 8A 
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35 Law Commission consultation paper Family Property Law (Working Paper No 42) cited by Lady Hale in Ilott v 
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However in larger estates (as those affected by IHT are) there is a difference between leaving 
everything to the spouse or civil partner and leaving them sufficient to live comfortably.  Once step 
families are brought into the equation it is evident that there are a variety of situations in which leaving 
everything to the testator’s spouse or civil partner may not be the best solution for a number of 
reasons. 
Correlation between IHT and Intestacy 
This emphasis on the spouse / civil partner was also reflected in changes to the intestacy provisions at 
a similar time.  The rise in property prices had resulted in a greater number of intestate estates 
exceeding the previous intestacy statutory legacies to the surviving spouse of £125,000 (spouse and 
issue) and £200,000 (spouse and other close relatives).  In February 2009 the statutory legacy of the 
spouse or civil partner on intestacy was raised to £250,000 if there were surviving issue and £450,000 
when there were other close relatives (parent, siblings, nieces and nephews),36 a move that ensured 
that in most cases of intestacy the spouse or civil partner inherited the entire estate.  Although this 
change was justified as a reaction to rising house prices37 it is argued that the twin effect of the 
legislative amendments in 2007 and 2009 was to emphasise that the primary heir should always be 
the spouse or civil partner, thereby encouraging such dispositions.   
There is, of course, a good reason for this, namely the retention of the family home, and recent 
reforms of the intestacy provisions have focused on preventing the loss of this property.38  However 
there is little evidence that this is a significant problem in intestacy situations; in 2008 it was estimated 
that there were only an estimated 1,200 cases per year in which the surviving spouse or civil partner 
was at risk of losing the family home following an intestacy and it was predicted that the increase in 
the statutory legacy in 2009 would reduce this number substantially.39  Furthermore in 80% of 
intestacy cases the family home was jointly owned as beneficial joint tenants with the survivor, 
removing the need for reliance on either the intestacy provisions or a will to protect the family home.40 
Therefore the legal ownership of the family home by the surviving spouse or civil partner is rarely an 
issue, but liability to pay IHT may impact adversely on the survivor’s ability to retain the family home.  
                                                          
36 Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order 2009 (SI 2009/135) 
37 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Administration of Estates – Review of the Statutory Legacy (2005), 
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38 Ibid, para 20 but compare with Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com 
191) para 3.14 
39 Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com 191) Para 3.23- 3.24 
40 Roger Kerridge, ‘Intestacy Reform in 2014’ in Birke Häcker and Charles Mitchell (eds), Current Issues in 
Succession Law (Hart 2016), 9   
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Although IHT payable on real property can be paid in instalments over up to ten years this deferral of 
payment does attract interest41 and the obligation to make regular payments would be very difficult 
to satisfy if the survivor had limited cash assets.   Selling the home would often be the only way to 
meet a substantial IHT liability, which is why the spouse / civil partner IHT exemption emphasises the 
priority and protection given to the home. 
Re-Marriage and Step Families 
Whilst the starting point for most people may be a belief that their spouse or civil partner will, or 
should, inherit everything,42 this prioritising of the spouse ignores the potential effects on the estate 
of re-marriage.43  If the surviving partner re-marries and replicates this “standard” situation of leaving 
all of their property to their new partner the overall effect will be to disinherit the children from the 
first marriage.  Many people take financial advice on entering into a second marriage (especially if 
they have assets over which they actively want to keep control) but often the step-parent will inherit 
the entire estate by virtue of either a will or intestacy44 and it is argued that the government’s stated 
aim of fairness when changing the taxation system has the potential to lead to perceived unfairness 
among children of the deceased as they see “family property” passing to the step-family.   
Various studies into public perceptions of who should inherit on intestacy demonstrate that there is 
no strong belief that the spouse should be entitled to all.  In contrast, responses to questions of 
entitlement change according to both the ages of the children and the presence of step-families.  In a 
study by NatCen and Cardiff University the responses to a question as to who should inherit when a 
man was survived by his second wife and children from his first marriage showed that very few 
respondents thought that everything should go to the second wife.  The majority of respondents 
instead favoured an estate distribution that ensured that some of his property passed to the children 
from the first marriage.45 
                                                          
41 Interest is charged on any tax not paid within six months after the end of the month in which the death 
occurred – Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s 227(1)-(4) 
42 See for example Law Commission Family Law: Distribution on Intestacy (Law Com No. 187) paras 28-29 and 
Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com 191) para 3.46 
43 Law Commission Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com 191) para 3.55 
44 See Sherrington v Sherrington [2005] EWCA Civ 326 and Wharton v Bancroft [2011] EWHC 3250 (Ch) for 
examples of the disputes that arise from such situations. 
45 A Humphrey, L Mills and G Morrell of the National Centre and G Douglas and H Woodward of Cardiff 
University, Inheritance and the family: attitudes to will-making and intestacy (NatCen, 2010), 48-49. 
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The contrast between the estate distribution favoured by the IHT legislation and public perceptions is 
further demonstrated by a recent study by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).46 This study focused 
on the changing expectations around inheriting money; more of the older generation are expecting to 
be able to leave a sizable inheritance and 75% of those born in the 1970s have either received or 
‘expect to receive’ an inheritance.47 These expectations rely on the presumption that there is a 
“natural order” to inheritance, an entitlement that could be destroyed only by health care costs.  A 
recent report by the Resolution Foundation noted that the value of inheritances is set to double by 
2035 and concluded that ‘most millennials might expect to get a share of a parental home 
eventually.’48   
This idea of a natural entitlement to parental property was brought into sharp focus during the 2017 
general election campaign when the Conservative party’s plans for the funding of social care for the 
elderly were slammed as a “dementia tax”.  The focus of the criticisms was not that the person in care 
would only have £100,000 but rather that this would be the maximum that their children would 
inherit; the dementia tax was seen as an attack on inheritance rights.  The debate about whether 
family wealth should be used to pay for social care or protected by the government for the benefit of 
future generations has been discussed elsewhere,49 and the publicity on this point in the run-up to the 
2017 General Election merely revitalised it.  However the conclusion of the IFS report, namely that 
‘inherited wealth is likely to play a more important role in determining the lifetime economic 
resources of younger generations’ underlines why making a will to reduce tax liabilities may create 
family rifts.  The intervention of new familial arrangements is not foreseen by the children or, even if 
it is, it is presumed that the testamentary dispositions of their parents will still favour them.  The 
juxtaposition of entitlement and disappointment can sow the seeds of litigation. 
Recent Amendments to Inheritance Act Rates and Allowances 
The summer budget of July 2015 announced a new extension to the NRB for those who wished to 
leave their ‘family home’ to ‘direct descendants, such as a child or grandchild.’50 The rationale was 
that rising house prices would otherwise lead to a doubling of estates liable to IHT to 63,000 by 2020-
                                                          
46 Institute for Fiscal Studies Inheritances and Inequality across and within Generations, IFS Briefing Note 
BN192 
47 ibid, part 2 
48 Resolution Foundation Intergenerational Commission Report, The Million Dollar Be-Question, December 
2017, 13 
49 N Hopkins and E Laurie, ‘Social Citizenship, Housing Wealth and the Cost of Social Care: Is the Care Act 2014 
“Fair”?’ (2015) 78 MLR 112, 113 cited in Brian Sloan, ‘Adult Social Care and Property Rights’ (2016) Vol 36(2) 
OJLS 428, 454 
50 Summer Budget 2015, para 1.219 
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21.51  Introduced on 6th April 2017, there is now a statutory tax incentive associated with leaving 
property to direct descendants, which may reverse some, at least, of the above influences.   
The detailed provisions were enacted by the Finance Act 201652 and are an interesting demonstration 
of how a government policy that can be explained in a few paragraphs in a budget report can require 
numerous statutory clauses to encapsulate in full.  The crucial limitation is that the property must be 
the main residence, but there are also provisions to enable those who have down-sized to a smaller 
property or who have sold their dwelling house since July 201553 to gain the benefit of the extended 
NRB.   
Although the budget report suggests that ‘direct descendants’ will be children and grandchildren, the 
new statute requires the property to be ‘closely inherited’54 for the tax benefits and the list of those 
beneficiaries who meet this criterion includes not just lineal descendants but also: 
 Spouses / civil partners of those lineal descendants 
 Surviving spouses / civil partners of lineal descendants who did not survive the deceased, as 
long as they have not re-married 
 Step-children, who are to be treated as the children of the step-parent 
 Adopted children, who can meet the criteria for being lineal descendants of both their natural 
and adoptive parents 
 Foster children, who are treated as the lineal descendants of the foster parent 
 Children who have had a guardian or special guardian appointed under s 5 or s 14A of the 
Children Act 1989 are regarded as the child of their guardian 
The breadth of this provision is quite breath-taking, and seems a complete volte-face when compared 
with the amendments of only a decade previously that encouraged the full estate to be left to the 
spouse / civil partner.  There are some aspects of this list that are worthy of further comment.  First 
of all it does not include siblings, nephews or nieces so is only capable of benefiting those with children 
(either by birth or step-children, adopted or foster children etc).  It is interesting to note that the 
introduction of inheritance provisions relating solely to real property (or the proceeds thereof) passing 
to lineal descendants re-creates to an extent a division between real and personal property that had 
been abolished by the 1925 property legislation.   
                                                          
51 ibid para 1.218 
52 Schedule 15  
53 Inheritance Act 1984, s 8H 
54 Inheritance Act 1984, s 8D and 8K 
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Secondly the fact that a legacy to an adopted child would count as property being closely inherited 
from both their natural and birth parents is an anomaly that contradicts the core principles of the law 
of adoption.   
Thirdly there is no definition of “step-child”.  One can only presume that the intention is that it be 
interpreted as per the Children Act 198955 such that the step-parent must be married to, or in a civil 
partnership with, the natural parent to qualify as a step-parent, so excluding those who cohabit from 
this tax relief.  In contrast to the recent amendment to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975 which includes those treated as a child of the family56 the taxation system 
remains focused on benefiting those who have formal relationships with the deceased. 
To take advantage of these provisions the deceased’s will or intestacy must result in the property 
being ‘inherited’,57 which occurs when the descendant becomes entitled either to the property, or to 
an interest in possession in the property, on the death of the deceased.  This would rule out the 
creation of a discretionary trust over the property for the potential benefit of both the spouse and 
children because this would not create the necessary interest in possession.  Whilst the impact of this 
on those who intended to use the NRBDT purely as a tax efficiency tool is simply to require a new will 
to be drawn up, the effect on those who intended to use trusts to control the destination of their 
wealth will be greater.  There is now a decision to be made between saving tax and creating the will 
that suits your family circumstances.  Every good private client lawyer knows that tax efficiency is 
secondary to ensuring that the will meets your client’s needs, but often clients will be swayed by the 
potential tax saving, especially when it is a five-figure sum.58 
The impact of this new IHT exemption comes into sharper relief when the “doubling up” potential 
between spouses and civil partners (referred to above) is considered.  From April 2017 the additional 
family home NRB can also be transferred, giving a maximum NRB on the death of the second party of 
£1 million by April 2020.59  However, this transfer is only possible once,60 so whilst it makes both 
taxation and inheritance “sense” to leave everything to the spouse or civil partner from a first 
marriage, as soon as the survivor enters into a second marriage they are faced with a conundrum.  The 
only way of using the full accumulated NRB is by making a will that ensures that their interest in the 
                                                          
55 Children Act 1989, s 4A 
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57 Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s 8J 
58 Headlines in many of the broadsheets in March 2017 specifically advised people to change their wills to save 
£70,000 of tax, for example. 




family home is closely inherited, by their children or step-children for instance.  The additional NRB 
will be wasted if they leave everything to their new spouse / civil partner, and a discretionary trust in 
favour of the children and their new spouse or civil partner does not have the tax benefits of an 
outright gift.   
The additional IHT liability of making a less tax-efficient will could be as much as £140,000 (two family 
home allowances of £175,000 at a tax rate of 40%) and a potential saving of this size is extremely likely 
to impact the survivor’s testamentary dispositions.  The author can imagine a situation in which a 
testator’s share of the family home is deliberately left to a step-child (at the expense of a child) 
because the testator knows that the step-child will be more sympathetic to the needs of their natural 
parent to remain in the family home. 
Whilst the future impact of these provisions is currently unknown, it is clear that the tax benefits of 
leaving property to direct descendants reverses to some extent the prioritisation of the spouse / civil 
partner that has taken place over the past decade.  The risk is that the testator loses focus on how 
they want to leave their property and focuses instead of how it ought to be left; i.e. what the most tax 
efficient disposal is.   
The Situation for Cohabitees 
In contrast to the above situation cohabitees do not have any right to their partner’s property under 
the intestacy provisions nor do they have the benefit of the spousal tax exemption or any ability to 
double up the NRB.  Each will lose whatever proportion of their NRB they do not use in full, so in order 
to take advantage of the new residential NRB they would need to ensure that their share of the family 
home is closely inherited, in preference to leaving it to their partner.  This may mean that testamentary 
freedom becomes a secondary issue, especially if the family home comprises the bulk of the estate.  
A survivor with few cash assets or a low income would struggle to meet any tax liability so making the 
most tax efficient disposal may be the only practical way that the survivor can retain the family home.  
The impact of IHT on the survivor’s ability to retain the family home was considered in Burden v UK61 
in which the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights noted that a relationship of co-
habitation was ‘fundamentally different to that of a married or civil partnership couple’62 and 
therefore an inheritance tax system that favoured those with the formalised relationship did not 
violate the European Convention on Human Rights art. 14.  The spouse / civil partner IHT exemption 
                                                          
61 Burden v UK [2008] ECHR 13378/05 
62 ibid, para 65 
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is one of the few remaining tax perks of a formal union; the changes over the last decade emphasised 
this preferential treatment and the residential NRB further relegates the status of cohabitees behind 
that of their children.  
Influence of the Residential Nil Rate Band on Lifetime Dispositions 
For those whose estates will be liable to IHT one key element of lifetime tax planning advice has been 
to make use of lifetime gifts.  Any gift made seven years or more before the death of the testator will 
be exempt from IHT,63 and even those more recent gifts attract a £3,000 annual exemption, along with 
other exemptions for gifts made on marriage for example.64  Thus by gifting away excess money during 
their lifetimes the elderly have long been able to limit the IHT payable on their death. 
Interestingly the new residential NRB might deter such lifetime gifts.  For example, an elderly person 
with an estate of between £325,000 and £500,000 would formerly have been advised to make 
judicious use of lifetime gifts, and the potential of a liability for long term residential care could also 
encourage such gifts.65  However the residential NRB would mean that this estate would be exempt 
from April 2020 (or earlier, depending on the value of the estate), as long as the family home is closely 
inherited.  As a result there would be no need for lifetime gifts.  One wonders whether the reduced 
need to give money away whilst alive might also ensure that more of the older generation retain the 
cash necessary to pay for any long term residential care they may require.    
Conclusion and Comments 
This paper has shown that whilst forced heirship might be alien to our legal tradition, the influence of 
taxation law on testamentary dispositions should not be underestimated; solicitors practising since 
the 1990s who have seen both the growth in use of the NRBDT and its subsequent decline will confirm 
this.  For families with substantial wealth the tax regime is hard to ignore and, of course, it is the 
wealth within these families that makes post-death litigation most likely.  In recent years the increase 
in the NRB together with changes to intestacy rules has meant that children will often not inherit 
anything until the death of the second parent.  The April 2017 IHT changes may reverse this trend and 
it remains to be seen whether it will exacerbate or ameliorate familial property disputes.  It seems 
                                                          
63 Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s3A(4) 
64 Inheritance Tax Act 1984, ss19-22 
65 Although it should be noted that the Care Act 2014 has wide-ranging anti-avoidance powers that may defeat 
the purpose of such gifts – see Brian Sloan, ‘Trusts and Anti-Avoidance under the Care Act 2014’ (2015) 79 
Conv. 489, 496  
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likely, given the attention it was given in the financial pages in early 2017, that it will lead a number of 
people to change their wills. 
However this paper has shown that the taxation mechanism is increasingly anomalous, prioritising the 
homes of those in formal relationships to the detriment of cohabitees and those without children.  
The family home seems an inappropriate central focus for a system of taxation; in 2011 the Law 
Commission rejected the option of focusing the intestacy laws on the family home on the basis of ‘the 
complexity and potential for unfairness generated by any reform that treats the family home in a 
different way to other assets in the estate’66 and the same comment could be applied to the new IHT 
provisions. 
If we wish to emphasise our testamentary freedom then perhaps it is time to overhaul the inheritance 
tax system so that a variety of lifestyle choices and testamentary dispositions are all taxed the same.  
This leads us to an interesting question: If we were introducing an inheritance tax system for the first 
time, what would a “fair” taxation system look like?  Would the emphasis be on the family home, and 
if so, what should be included in the definition of “family”?  Or would the emphasis be on tax breaks 
for legacies to the spouse / civil partner?  If protection of the family home is the core requirement, 
would this be better achieved by way of a charge over the property to be repaid on sale?   
The massive leap from zero tax to a 40% band is unusual, even more so since the reform to Stamp 
Duty Land Tax in 2014.67 A taxation structure such as this concentrates the mind on how to avoid tax, 
in contrast to a more graduated scheme which would feel less punitive.  The dementia tax debacle re-
emphasised the extent to which “tax” is a dirty word, but the purpose of any tax should not be to 
influence the testator towards certain dispositions.  The primary purpose should be compliance with 
our general obligation to contribute to the country’s finances; only once this obligation is complied 
with does testamentary freedom arise. 
 
                                                          
66 Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death, (Law Com No 331, 2011) para 2.50 
67 Stamp Duty Land Tax Act 2015, s 1 
